AN OVERVIEW: THE PRIVATE UNIVERSITY
AND DUE PROCESS
In affording students the constitutional protection of due process,
courts have generally differentiated between those students who attend
public colleges and universities and those who attend private, but
otherwise similar, institutions.' Since public universities are
considered to be instruments of the state, their students must be
granted that degree of due process required by the fourteenth
amendment. 2 In dealing with private universities, on the other hand,
courts have refused to apply constitutional standards because of a

lack of state action.' Thus, the procedural safeguards afforded a
student by law at a private university generally are limited, if not
eliminated, by the application of either a contractual theory' or the
doctrine of in loco parentis Courts have determined that the private
university student need receive no procedural safeguards since

attendance at a private school is not a right but a privilege which may
be discontinued at the option of the university
1. Compare Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961) with Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632,231 N.Y.S.2d 410, rev'g, 34
Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
2. See Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73
(2d Cir. 1968); 294 F.2d 150. See also Comment, Procedural Limitations on the Expulsion of
College and University Students, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 542, 545 (1966). For an example ofjudicial
standards in reviewing student discipline in public universities see General Order on Judicial
Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported
Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (en banc).
3. See 407 F.2d 73; Groosner v. Trustees of Colum. Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See generally Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20
U. FLA. L. REv. 290 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (Fla. App. 1958); Carr v. St. John's
Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App.
Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928), rev'g, 130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1927). Cf.
Jones v. Vassar College, 59 Misc. 2d 296, 299, 299 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286 (Broome County Ct.
1969).
5. See John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Gott v. Berea College,
156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W.2d 204 (1913). For a discussion of in loco parentis and its fall into
disrepute see notes 63-69 infra and accompanying text.
6. For a case holding that even a public college education is a privilege see Board of Trustees
v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 623,633-34, 62 So. 827,830-31 (1914), affd, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
For a statute which incorporates the privilege theory, see FLA. Sass. L. SERv. ch. 69-279
(1969), which provides that:
Any person who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of this state of attendance
. . . at any state college, state junior college or state university shall. . . be deemed to
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Some commentators believe that no adequate justification has been
offered for this distinction between public and private colleges!
Neveitheless, in recent years, not only have students at private
universities been treated differently from students at public
universities, but, in at least one case, students attending the same

university were not granted equal access to the courts because they
were enrolled in a "private" college of the university while others were

enrolled in a ,"public" college of the same university! This result,
while perhaps defensible as an interpretation and application of
existing constitutional law decisions, is "impractical" and "reflects
imperfectly the realities of higher education."'
.Notwithstanding the recent decisions reflecting the continued

reluctance of the courts to apply constitutional standards to the
disciplinary proceedings of private universities, commentators are

virtually unanimous in agreeing that courts will soon be forced, under
one or more of several theories, to afford equal procedural safeguards

to students in private universities.
STATE ACTION

Several writers have attempted to show that the disciplinary
proceedings of a private university involve a degree of state action

sufficient to necessitate the application of the fourteernth amendment's
due process clause due to the great expansion during the past decade

of both the state action doctrin10 and the degree of governmental
have given his consent to the policies of that institution, the Board of Regents, and the
laws of this state. Such policies shall include prohibition against disruptive activities at
state institutions of higher learning.
If after it has been determined that a student . . . has participated in disruptive
activities, the following penalties may be imposed. . . (2) Imediate expulsion. . . for a
minimum of twoyears ....
7. See O'Neil, Private Universitiesand PublicLaw, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 166-67 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as O'Neil]; Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary
Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REv. 87, 90 (1968); Note, The College Student and Due Process in
DisciplinaryProceedings,1962 U. ILL. L.F. 438,439.
8. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
9. See O'Neil 160; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Student Academic Freedom-"StateA ction"
and Private Universities, 44 TUL. L. RE,. 184 (1969). See also Note, The Admissibility oj
Testimony Coercedby a University, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 435,440 (1970); Comment, Student
Due Process in the Private University: The State Action Doctrine, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 911,
921 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., Inc., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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involvement in private higher education." Indeed, where a racially

discriminatory admissions policy has been found, the courts have not
been reluctant to apply the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to private schools." Thus, those cases which have held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has no
application to the-disciplinary proceedings of a private tniversity may

no longer be authoritative'

3

The above factors and the increased

awareness of the social importance of higher education have

precipitated the development of several theories by which state action
can arguably be found in the disciplinary proceedings of a private

university.
SubstantialState Involvement

State action sufficient to require application of the fourteenth
amendment will be found where the state or federal government

becomes substantially involved in or exercises substantial control over
an otherwise private enterprise. 4 Such state intervention in the area of

private higher education can be shown in numerous ways.
FinancialAid. 5 Private colleges and universities receive financial

aid from government treasuries in several forms including
scholarships, fellowships, student loans, and government work-study
programs."6 In addition, private universities are often the receipients
I1. See, e.g., O'Neil 168-88; Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 290; Note, Scope of University
Discipline, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 486 (1969); Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably
Enforced- Guidelines for University DisciplinaryProceedings,53 MINN. L. REv. 301 (1968);
20 SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 9; Comment, The ConstitutionalRights of CollegeStudents,
42 TEXAS L. REV. 344 (1964); Comment, Private Government on the Campus-JudicialReview
of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
12. See Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania v.
Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See also Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance
Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833,854 (E.D. La. 1967), affd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Griffin v. State Bd.
of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965). Cf.Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 727 (1945).
13. See Kutner, Habeas Scholastica:An Ombudsman for Academic Due Process-A
Proposal,23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 151 (1968); TEXAs L. REV., supra note 10, at 347.48.
14. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., Inc.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961). See also 53 MINN. L. REv., supra note 11, at 305-06; 20 SYRACUSE L.
REV., supra note 9, at 914-15.
15. For a case finding state action where a state provided financial aid to a private school see
Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965). Cf. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free
Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
16. See Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 854 (E.D.
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of government research grants. 7 These schools also receive indirect
financial aid in the form of tax-exemption, use or loan of public land
and buildings, and the availability to some schools of the power of
eminent domain.' Moreover, the building programs of private
universities are occasionally underwritten by government loans and
insurance programs. 9 That such financial aid breeds governmental
control can be seen from the warning of one university educatoradministrator that schools should accept government aid only where
it is. most necessary and after very careful reflection since such
acceptance miy result in the school's becoming tied to the purse
strings of the governmentP
State Regulationi.2 In addition to the governmental control and
regulation which may result from the school's receipt of public funds,
there may be more direct evidence of state regulation of private
education. For example, the private university depends upon the state
for its authority to award degreesF and is subject to state educational
La. 1967); Note, Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5
WILLIAME.-E

L. REv. 277,290 (1969).

Several states award scholarship grants to qualified resident students attending either public
or private universities within the state. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 601(4) (1969); Oriro REv.
CODE ANN. § 3333.12 (Supp. 1969). In addition, several states loan monies or guarantee loans
to resident students attending any accredited university. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, § 20111 (1964) (loans to both schools and students); N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 651 (1964). The federal
government is now deeply involved in financing both students and the universities. Money is
loaned to universities for the construction of academic facilities, 20 U.S.C. § 741 (1964);
educational opportunity grants passing through universities to the students totaling $140 million
-are authorized for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, id. § 1061 (Supp. IV, 1969); loan
programs are bolstered and encouraged through loan insurance, loan guarantees, and interest
supplements, id. §§ 1071-82; direct loans are also available, id. at § 1083.
17. See Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 291.
18. See generally O'Neil 185. In Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969), it was
held that the granting of tax exempt status to a private university was not state action.
The power of eminent domain appears to be available to private universities in California.
CAL. Crv. PRO. CODES § 1238(2), (8) (1955). Two leading cases, Appeal of Rees, 8 Sad. (Pa.)
582, 12 Ad. 427,430 (1888), and Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88
Ad. 633, 636 (1913), have held that, because education has a public purpose, state statutes
granting the right of eminent domain to private universities are constitutional. See generally 4
So. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1931).
19. See. e.g., 2 0 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 291.
20. See Kirk, Massive Subsidies and Academic Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa. 607
(1963).
21. In Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), government action was found
where the Commission had regulatory control over a bus line.
22. For example, Louisiana provides:
[The state board of education] has the authority to approve private schools and colleges
...
. [T]he certificates or degrees issued by such private schools or institutions so
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standards? Further, in some states the school's license or charter is
granted by the state 4

Public Function.P Several authorities have noted that state action
is present in the activities of a private university because these

institutions fulfill a public function2

The importance of higher

education in our-present society hardly need be argued. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has stated, "Today, education is perhaps the most

important function of state and local governments."

7

Were private

institutions not to provide this service, society would most surely

demand that it be provided by the government. Although a court
need not under this public function theory make reference to

governmental involvement in private higher education, an
examination of the extent of government assistance channeled toward

private colleges and universities will aid in demonstrating the public
nature of higher education. The extensive financial aid granted by the
government to private universities has been justified on the grounds

that these expenditures were being applied for a public purpose.? It
should also be noted that some private universities have received the

benefit of the power of eminent domain, the power to take land for a
public purpose.?

Quasi-public or Quasi-governmentalPowers

t

Because of the

approved shall carry the same privileges as those issued by state schools." LA. REv.
STAT. § 17:411 (Supp. 1969).
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-330(b) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 144, § 234 (1964).
See generally 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1384.
23. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1615 (Replacement 1960) (no degree until successful
completion of American history course). For an interesting case suggesting that state action
can exist if a state intended that a college adopt a "hard line" toward protesters, see Coleman
v. Wagner College,_ F.2d - (2d Cir. 1970).
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-330(d) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, § 122
(1964). See also Goldman, The University and the Liberty oflts Students-A Fiduciary Theory,
54 Ky. L.J. 643,650 (1966).
25. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Court held that a private political
association which duplicated the function of the state in conducting a pre-primary election
among its membership violated the fifteenth amendment by refusing to admit Negro members.
The contention that the association was a private political club was rejected because it
performed a public function.
26. See note 11 supra; Cohen, The Private-PublicLegal Aspects of Institutions of Higher
Education,45 DENvER LJ.643 (1968); 10 ST. Louis L.J., supra note 2.
27. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
28. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 650; 5 WiLLA~m-r L. Ray., supra note 16, at 285.
29. See Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 317, 42 A. 87, 88 (1899); See also
New Haven v. Board of Trustees, 59 Conn. 163, 167, 22 A. 157, 157 (1890). See note 18 supra.
30. See O'Neil 183-84. See note 18 supra.
31. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court held that residents of a company
town were entitled to protection of the liberties guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
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great power of a university over its students, each private university is3
functionally a government 32 and is analogous to a company town?
Students often live on the private school's property, conduct most of
their daily business in university stores and with university
representatives, and are expected to mold their personal conduct to
comply with university rules. Thus, the private university holds a
power vis-a-vis the student which is essentially governmental. 3
Moreover, as noted above, the private university is often granted the
benefit of specific governmental powers,3 and in some instances, the
school may designate its students as members of a profession licensed
by the state merely by conferring the appropriate degree. In
addition, private universities may also have the power to terminate
government financial aid granted to its students?7 Finally, at least one
authority believes that the private university's power to grant or
withhold a degree is in itself a sufficient governmental power to
require that the institution be subject to the fourteenth amendment? 8
IndiciaApproach?9 The indicia approach, which mdst arouses the
optimism of those who advocate an expansion of the state actioh
doctrine to the disciplinary proceedings of a private university,
requires a "sifting and weighing" of all factors which concern the
applicability of the fourteenth amendment to the private institution,
including any factors which indicate state involvement in private
higher education. 0 Thus, a court would not only consider the
amendments. It reasoned that where the state permits private interests to exercise what is
normally thought to be governmental authority, those private interests are subject to the same
restrictions as the state.
32. See O'Neil 178, 184. Seegenerally 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1410.
33. See, e.g., O'Neil 187; 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1386.

34. See O'Neil i81.
35. Id. at 183-84. See note 18 supra.

36. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.28(1) (1957). This statute provides that the graduates
of accredited Wisconsin law schools'be admitted to practice law in Wisconsin without bar
examination. See generally O'Neil 184.
37. Id.; see 35 BROOKLYN L, REv., supra note 11, at 491.
38. O'Neil 178.

39. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., Inc., 365 U.S. 715 (1960), where the Court,
after .noting that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance," Id. at 722,
proceeded to evaluate such factors as public ownership of the land and building, public use of the
building, and public maintenance of the building, in order to conclude that
[a]ddition of all these activities, obligations, and responsibilities. . . [and] the benefits
mutually conferred . . . indicates that degree of state participation and involvement in
discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn,
40. See, e.g., Kutner, supra note 13, at 150-53; 81

HARV.

L. REV., supra note 11, at 1058-60,
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indicators of both "state involvement" and "public function," but
would also give these and any other factors relating the state to the
private university a cumulative effect' Where a court cannot justify a
finding of state action in the activities of a private university based
merely upon quasi-governmental powers, public function, or state
involvement it could combine these and other factors to establish a
degree of state action sufficient to require the application of the
fourteenth amendment to the disciplinary proceedings 2 Such other
factors include a degree of interdependence between public and private

schools, a particular course of study available only at a private
school, and any special protection which the state grants a private
university!'
It is possible that a court will apply one of these four theories of

state action in order to require a private university to grant to its
students that degree of procedural protection which the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment dictates. Judge J. Skelly Wright
has observed:
At the outset one may question whether any school or college can ever be so

"private" as to escape the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a country
dedicated to the creed that education is the only "sure foundation . . . of
freedom, without which no republic can maintain itself in strength"
institutions of learning are not things of purely private concern. . . . No one
any longer doubts that education is a matter affected with the greatest public
interest. And this is true whether it is offered by a public or private
institution. . . . Clearly the administrators of a private college are performing
a public function. They do the work of the state, often in place of the state.
Does it not follow that they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they not
then agcnts of the state, subject to the constitutional restraints on governmental
action, to the same extent as private persons who govern a company town, or
control a political party . . . or run a city street car and bus service. . . or
operate a train terminaP"

Similarly, it has been noted that the character of the private university

is molded by the governmental influence exerted over it and the
governmental power which it exerts over its students. Arguably, this

alone is a sufficient basis for applying the fourteenth amendment to
See generally 20 SYRAcusE L. REv., supra note 9; 5 WILLAMETre L. REV., supra note 16, at 285.
41. See 20 SYRAcUsE L. REv., supra note 9, at 917; see generally Kutner, supra note 13, at
151-53.
42. Cf. O'Neil 182.
43. Id.at 182-87; Kutner, supra note 13, at 151.
44. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La.), rev'd
306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted).
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the private university! 5 Most writers agree that substantial expansion
of the state action concept is unnecessary to require the application of
fourteenth amendment procedural protection to a private university's
disciplinary proceedings." Therefore, as a college education becomes
even more necessary and as private school dependence upon
government financial support increases, courts will find it
correspondingly more difficult to refuse to measure the private
university's actions by fourteenth amendment standards!'
• To date, attempts to apply the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause to the disciplinary proceedings of a private university
have been expressly rejected!' The Supreme Court has issued no
opinion on the subject. In general, the courts have refused to find that
higher education is a sufficiently public function to constitute state
action 9 or have required that the state be involved not merely with
higher education in general, or with the school in particular, but
directly in the disciplinary proceedings challengedP Such decisions
have received substantial criticism. In most cases, courts considered
each segment of state involvement, each public function, and each of
the private university's quasi-governmental powers individually and
find them to be an insufficient indication of state action. Judicial
opinions in this area evidence a failure to combine these individual
indicators in order to determine whether state action results from a
52
cumulation
Since the fourteenth amendment is applicable to a private
university for purposes of preventing a racially discriminatory
admissions policy,O it arguably should also be applicable to a private
university's dismissal of students without proper procedural
45. See O'Neil 181.
46. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 24, at 650; 35 BROOKLYN L. REV., supra note II, at 49192; 42 TEXAS L. REV. supra note 11, at 349.
47. See 53 MINN. L. itav., supra note 11, at 309; 5 WILLMETrE L. Rmv.,supra note 16, at 287-

88. See also REPORT OF THE A.B.A. CoMMITTEE ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT
DISSEN', 17-18 (1970) (statement of Commission members Clark, Dash, Long, Shestach, &
Young).
48. See, e.g., Powe v. Miles, 407oF.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Groosner v. Trustees of Colum,
Univ. 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
49. See 287 F. Supp. at 548.
50. See 407 F.2d at 8.L But see 55 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 9, at 439-40.
51. See, e.g., 55 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 9, at 440; 20 SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 9,
at 921-22; 44 TULANE L. REV., supra note 9, at 187-189.
52. See, e.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80-83 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. See note I Isupra.

PRIVATE UNIVERSITY

Vol. 1970:795]

safeguards.

4

However, it is argued that the courts should draw the

line after racial discrimination, and student discipline should not
require private universities to comply fully with the provisions of the

fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights. 55 For example, a
Catholic university should be able to give religious instruction without
being limited by the establishment clause of the first amendment.

Thus, a finding of state action for purposes of applying the due
process clause to a private university's disciplinary proceedings does

not mean that for all purposes the private university "becomes" the
stateY7 Undoubtedly the private university would not be required to

extend to its students that degree of procedural protection which the
state is required to afford a criminal defendant. 5 8 Finally, those who

advocate an extension of the state action concept to include the
disciplinary proceedings insist that such an extension will not permit
the courts to interfere with the academic freedom of the university, a

matter heretofore respected and defended by the courts. 9
Other Theories of the Student-Private University Relationship
While no court has yet applied fourteenth amendment limitations

to the disciplinary proceedings of a private university, the studentprivate university relationship has been examined under several
theories unrelated to constitutional law. Recent court decisions and

the opinions of many authorities reveal that existing theories are
either no longer acceptablP0 or should be reexamined in the light of

2
recent developments in both the legal and the academic environment!

Most authorities agree that under the theories of the student-

university- relationship which remain viable the private university will
be required to afford its students substantially the same procedural
54. See generally 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 11, at 1056; 20 SYRACUSE L. Rev., supranote
9, at 921-22.
55. See Cohen, supra note 26, at 647-48; 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1386.
56. See Cohen, supranote 26, at 647-48; 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1386.
57. O'Neil 165.
58. See French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. La. 1969); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). But see Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778.
(2d Cir. 1967); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 99, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899,906 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
See also 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1386.
59. O'Neil 165-67.
60. See, e.g., 35 BROOKLYN L. REv., supra note 11, at 489-90, 495.
61. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 294.
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safeguards that the fourteenth amendment requires the public
university to afford its students!'
In Loco Parentis.After many years of consistent application 3 the
vast majority of courts and scholars agree that the doctrine of in loco
parentis no longer defines the student-university relationship." It is

doubtful that any court will use it to support a university's defense
against judicial interference in a university disciplinary proceeding. A
major factor contributing to the demise of the doctrine is the courts'
awareness that the theory could not be applied to the thousands of

students who have reached their majority" or who are married or
otherwise free of parental control.6 Moreover, the student-university
arrangement is far more impersonal than the typical parent-child
relationship.6 7 With regard to student expulsion, it should also be
realized that under no circumstances would parents be allowed to
evict their child6 8 Finally, if the school's power over the student is
based upon a delegation of power to it from the student's parents, it is

not difficult to envision a breakdown in the school's authority should
parents instruct the institution to act toward their child in a manner
inconsistent with its own rules63
Contract. Courts have frequently found that a contractual

relationship exists between the student and the university!' Under this
theory the student's rights are determined by the express and implied

provisions of the student-university contract!' Contractual provisions
are derived from admission applications; registration forms,
62. See 5 WILLAMETrE L. REV., supra note 16, at 294; see also, Holland, The Student and the
Law, 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 61,66 (1969); 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 11,at 1143.
63. For a discussion of the application of in locoparentissee Holland, supra note 62.
64. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725,729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buttny v.
Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280,286 (D. Colo. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747, 756 (W.D. La. 1968). See generally Goldman, supra note 24, at 650; Van Alsytne,
Student Academic Freedom and Rule-Making Powers at Public Universities: Some
ConstitutionalConsiderations 2 LAw IN TRANS Q. 1, 17 (1965); 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note
11, at 1144; Note, The College Student and Due Process in DisciplinaryProceedings, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 438; 5 WILLAMET E L. REv., supra note 16, at 293.
65. See Holland, supra-note62, at 66; Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 17-18.
66. 35 BROOKLYN L. REv., supra note 11, at 487.
67. Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 294.
68. Id. at 295. But cf.53 MINN. L. REv., supra note 11, at 311-12.
69. Holland, supra note 62, at 68.
70. See, e.g., Carr v. .. Johns Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962);
Comment, A Student Right to a Hearing on Dismissalfrom a University, 10 STAN. L. REv. 746
(1958).
71. See 10 STAN. L. REv.,supra note 70, at 746.
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catalogues or bulletins, and the school's rules and regulations? 2 It is
assumed that the student knew of and agreed to conform to these
provisions 73
Unlike the courts, most scholars who have considered the subject
agree that the contract theory, as it has been applied, is inappropriate
for the student-university relationship.!4 The student should not be
bound by terms buried within school catalogues, applications, or
registration forms, which he could not reasonably have been expected
to read carefully! 5 The writers generally believe that if a contract
exists between the student and the university it is a contract of
adhesion and should not be given full effect,76 in part because the
student is severely limited in his selection of a school for financial and
geographical reasons, 77 and because there is no bargaining-the
school dictates the terms of the contract7 In addition, perhaps
neither the student nor the university views the relationship as
contractual, 7' the student seldom conceiving that he is entering into a
business arrangement. Thus, it is urged that the student-university
relationship should not be governed by the law of the market place °
Many of those conceding that the student-university relationship
is contractual claim that the courts have not properly applied contract
law' They contend that in dismissing a student the school is, in effect,
terminating the contract for the student's breach thereof and should,
therefore, bear the burden of justifying its action8 2 The courts, on the
other hand, have generally required the student to show that the
school has acted arbitrarily in dismissing him83 even though the
university, not the student, generally possesses the information
72. Goldman, supra note 24, at 651.
73. 5 WILLIAETrE L. REv., supra note 16, at 278. See also FLA. SEss. L. SERV. Ch. 69-279
(1969) (reproduced at note 6 supra).
74. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 24, at 652-53; Kutner, supra note 13, at 143; 53 MINN. L.
Ray., supra note 11, at 314. But see Wilkinson & Rolapp, The Private College and Student
Discipline.56 A.B.A.J. 121 (1970).
75. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 653.
76. Goldman, supra note 24, at 653-54; 35 BROOKLYN L. Rav., supra note 10, at 487-88; 5
WILLAME'rE L. REv., supra note 16, at 281-82.
77. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 653; Kutner, supra note 13, at 143..
78. See 18 HARV. L. REv.,supra note 11, at 1146.
79. Id.
80. See Goldman, supra note 24, at 652-53.
81. See, e.g., Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406, 1408-

09 (1957).
82. Id. at 1409.
83. Id.; 81 HARV. L. REv.,supra note 11, at 1146.
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concerning the basis of dismissal. Therefore, it is contended, a proper
application of contract law would place the burden of proof on the
university!'
FiduciaryRelationship. A recent theory of the student-university
relationship suggested by several authorities postulates the existence
of a fiduciary relationship between the student and university; thus,
their disputes should be settled under the law of trust rather than
contract.! It is contended that the student places a high degree of trust
and confidence in the university which he attends and relies upon the
university whose function and duty it is to educate the student and is
in a position of dominance over the student," to perform its duties in a
7
manner benefiting him.!
Because of this fiduciary relationship, the courts should carefully
examine the university's conduct and require of the university the
highest standard of integrity.88 In effect, the university as a fiduciary
would have the burden of showing that any disciplinary a~tion
imposed was both reasonable and necessary in light of the university's
function and that the disciplinary sanctions were imposed only after a
fair and just proceeding.88 It is not difficult to perceive that the
university because of its fiduciary relationship to the student should
be required to afford its students at least that degree of procedural
protection required by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendmentY0
CONCLUSION

It is not at all unlikely that the courts may soon require that
private colleges and universities afford their students that degree of
procedural due process which the fourteenth amendment requires a
public university to provide its students. One or more of the following
theories might be utilized: an extension of the state action doctrine; a
sensitive approach to the contract relationship between the student
and the university; or an acceptance of the fiduciary nature of the
84. 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 11, at 1146; Cohen, supra note 26, at 645-46.
85. See, e.g., Kutner, supra note 13, at 152-53; 53 MINN. L. REV., supra note 11, at 331-33; 5
WILLAMEr L. REv.,supra note 16, at 293-94. For a critical view see Holland, supranote 62, at
71.
86. Goldman, supra note 24, at 672.
87. Id.; Seavey, supra note8l, at 1407 n.3.
88. Goldman, supra note 24, at 674.
89. Id.
90. See Seavey, supra note 81, at 1407 n.3; 72 YALE L.J., supra note !1, at 1382.
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student-university relationship. There is no sound basis for the refusal
of the courts to investigate any disciplinary proceeding which results
in a student's dismissal from a private university especially since the
same courts require procedural fairness for students expelled from a
public university? 1 Expulsion from a private school has no less effect
upon a student than expulsion from a public school and usually will
have at least as much impact upon the student as the decisions of the
local, state, or federal government 3 Because of this impact many feel
judicial intervention in the disciplinary proceedings of a private
university is necessary9
There are a number of theories under which a private university
might be bound by the same or similar limitations applicable to a
public university, but a court can first determine the standard by
which it will judge the university's activity and then select a theory
appropriate for imposing such a standardY5 The central issue concerns
the circumstances under which a court should interfere with the
disciplinary proceedings of a private university in order to insure that
the student is given fair and reasonable treatmentY6 The degree, if any,
of judicial intervention depends upon the sanction imposed upon the
student, his alleged offense, and the size and facilities of the university.
In order to insure freedom from judicial interference and, more
important, to uphold university integrity by insuring that students are
subjected only to fair and just proceedings, the private universities
should afford their students at least that degree of procedural
protection which the courts require public universities to provide.
91. 5 WILLAMEr'E L. REV., supra note 16, at 294.
92. See 20 SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 9, at 912. See also 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at
1387-90.
93. See 72 YALE L.J.,supra note 11, at 1389.
94. Id. at 1387-90; 81 HARV. L. REv., supra note 11, at 1156-57.
95. See generally id. at 646,648; 72 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 138 1.
96. See Cohen, supra note 26, at 646.

